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3This document has been prepared as an integral part of the 
project “Strengthening the Voice of Business.” The project is being 
implemented by the Serbian Association of Managers (SAM) and the 
Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies (CLDS), in partnership and with 
the support of the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) 
in Washington DC, USA. CIPE, SAM, and CLDS are working together 
to strengthen the voice of business in the dialogue with government 
on priorities for economic reform in Serbia. The partnership between 
the three organizations also focuses on building the capacity of 
the Serbian business community to participate meaningfully in 
the policymaking process. In preparation of this document, SAM 
and partners closely collaborated with regional Serbian chambers 
of commerce and business representatives in Valjevo, Niš, and 
Požarevac to jointly identify and select the issues that represent 
key legislative impediments for businesses in Serbia. Cooperation 
with regional businesses and chambers of commerce resulted in a 
broader consensus among private sector representatives and think 
tank experts on the top reform priorities. Included in this document 
are “Proposals for the improvement of labor legislation” which will 
be used by business sector representatives as a tool for advocating 




Introduction ..................................................................................................   7
Labor relations models  .............................................................................   9
Serbian labor legislation ........................................................................... 12
European processes  .................................................................................. 14
Basic weak points of labor law in Serbia  ............................................ 18
 Employment  .................................................................................... 18
 Personal income .............................................................................. 25
Disciplinary accountability  ..................................................................... 28
 Dismissal  ........................................................................................... 29
 Extended application of collective agreements  ................. 32
Instead of a conclusion  ............................................................................ 34
6
7LABOUR LEGISLATION AS A SUPPORT TO MORE 
SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF ECONOMY 
The present analysis aims first to give a brief outline of the 
major weak points of domestic labor legislation from the point 
of view of modern labor law and the needs of economic life in 
Serbia, which, following a debate in the Serbian Association of 
Managers, would serve as a basis for formulating recommendations 
for amendments to labor legislation. Attention has also been paid 
to some extent to international and European labor standards, 
constituting a framework which inevitably affects labor legislation 
in Serbia.  
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of labor relations has a significant bearing on 
a company’s operation: it affects employer-employee relations, 
the organization of work, the volume of administrative work in a 
company, the number of effective working hours, employee salaries 
and other benefits and, generally, each company’s operating costs. 
In many countries, Serbia included, the legislators’ intent to 
create a balance between employees and employers by regulating 
labor relations is proclaimed, i.e. their intent to ensure the protection 
of employee interests, but in such a way as not to jeopardize the 
economy’s operation and efficiency. The question is, however, 
whether such intent is feasible and whether it is brought about in 
real life, since broadening employee rights usually has a negative 
bearing on a company’s operation in one way or another.  
 (Excessive) overprotection of employees, i.e. rigid labor 
legislation can also significantly make difficult a company’s 
adaptation to changed business circumstances: labor legislation 
acceptable in good times can prove not to be so acceptable in a crisis, 
8when the operation method should be altered, expenses cut, the 
volume of production very often reduced, and even the workforce 
sometimes, and when due to labor legislation the employers’ hands 
are tied or they are faced with a prohibitively high cost of adapting. 
Similarly, rigid labor legislation significantly makes difficult the 
necessary constant adaptation of a company to competition and a 
highly dynamic environment of open economies, causing domestic 
companies to suffer losses in competitiveness         vis-à-vis foreign 
competitors.
Regrettably, labor legislation is considerably affected also 
by political factors, i.e. the parties’ efforts to boost their respective 
political ratings by broadening employee rights. Consequently, the 
issue of regulation being changed so as to benefit voters, who are 
employees, is raised from time to time, without paying due attention 
to other actors in the process and the ultimate economic effects of 
such proposals.  
Both the media as well as the public usually favor employees, 
which results in support to broader legal protection of employees 
at the expense of freedom of bargaining over labor relations. 
In the process, employers are more often than not seen as the 
workers’ exploiters who need to be kept in check rather than as 
those organizing economic activity, providing employment and 
having their own rights as well as understandable interests. In the 
text below, we shall try to shed some light on labor legislation in 
a more balanced way, while in the section dealing with its specific 
weak points, priority will be given to those primarily posing either 
a work, administrative or financial burden to a company’s efficient 
operation. 
Beyond the domain of labor legislation, there are numerous 
serious problems facing the economy and needing to be addressed 
as well, such as broader problems related to the abuse of sick 
leave, the system of registering and cancelling the registration of 
employees, the practice applied by courts in labor disputes etc., but 
we have not tackled them on this occasion, limiting our efforts to 
the Labor Law instead.   
9LABOUR RELATIONS MODELS
The classical concept of differences in labor relations has 
resulted in their being classified into two models, namely, the liberal 
and the protective. The United States (US), Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, (and even) Great Britain and Ireland belong to the liberal 
camp, whereas the majority of European countries belong to the 
protective camp. The main characteristics of these models can be 
summed up as follows: 
The liberal (Anglo-Saxon) model:
 ● easier employment and dismissal procedures, since it is believed 
that each party has the right to conclude an employment 
contract freely and to terminate it at  will (e.g. in the US); this 
right has recently been restricted by a discrimination ban; 
 ● shorter employment in one company, which naturally follows 
from easier  dismissal procedures, making a given job available 
to another employee;   
 ● moderate unemployment benefits in order to stimulate an 
unemployed person to search for a job;
 ● trade unions are not particularly strong, since they are not 
given a special role under legislation as in the case of the 
protective model; 
 ● labor relations are quite conflicting, but usually within a 
company, since the model is based on the market principle 
rather than social mediation;
 ● bargaining over salaries is primarily decentralized, i.e. it is 
primarily done at  company level, which means that a company’s 
trade union and the employer bargain over the issue;  
 ● income inequality is more pronounced, since the labor 
market mainly freely decides on salaries depending on labor 
supply and demand and the employees’ contribution to their 
company’s success; 
 ● younger and older generations are in an equal position; 
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 ● unemployment rate is usually lower, since easier dismissal 
procedures encourage employers to hire new employees, 
while relatively low benefits in the event of unemployment 
encourage unemployed persons to search for jobs. 
The protective (continental) model:
 ● legal protection against dismissal, since dismissal is only 
possible if there is a valid reason for it, while a dismissed 
employee is often entitled to severance pay  paid by the 
employer; 
 ● longer service with the same company, since the dismissal 
frequency is low, specifically if compared to the liberal model; 
 ● more generous unemployment benefits, since under the 
welfare state concept efforts are made to prevent a decline in 
the living standards of those who have lost their jobs; 
 ● strong trade unions as a consequence of both the tradition 
of unionization as well as labor legislation providing for their 
formally important role in collective bargaining; 
 ● more co-operative labor relations due to developed social 
dialogue in which state representatives, employer associations 
and trade unions try to avoid         employer-employee conflicts 
by finding negotiated solutions;  
 ● collective bargaining over salaries is more centralized, i.e. it is 
mainly conducted at national/industry level, applying to the 
companies concerned; 
 ● more balanced income distribution as a result of the concern 
by (some) key players in centralized collective bargaining over 
balanced salaries and of the elimination of the labor market 
impact; 
 ● older generations fare better than younger generations, since 
they are protected by inflexibility, whereas younger persons 
mainly account for the unemployed contingent; 
 ● unemployment rate is usually higher, because dismissal 
constitutes a difficult and usually expensive process and, as 
a result, there is a more modest demand for new employees 
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(employers are reluctant to hire new employees since they 
know that it will be hard to dismiss them if their services are no 
longer needed). 
Elsewhere in the world, there are no clear-cut models so 
that labor legislation varies depending on a political (democratic/
non-democratic) system, the state authorities’ capacity, tradition, 
emulation of the above models etc.  
The difference between the liberal and the protective model 
lies in a different point of view. The liberal model gives priority to 
economic logics, because its primary concern is to ensure the good 
functioning of a company at micro level and of the overall economy 
at macro level. When business circumstances deteriorate, it enables 
companies to adjust relatively simply either the employment level 
or salary levels, within the institutional framework based on free 
bargaining between employees and employers. The central idea is 
that healthy companies equal a healthy economy, which eventually 
(i.e. in the long run) leads to high employment and good salaries.   
On the other hand, the protective model gives priority to 
the social aspect, i.e. the employees’ security and living standards 
even when economic circumstances deteriorate. Even then, the 
companies’ and the economy’s simple way of adapting by changing 
the employment and salary levels is not accepted, but by ensuring 
the security of jobs, i.e. by  making it hard to dismiss employees 
and reduce their salaries, companies and the economy as a whole 
are left to shoulder the entire burden of adaptation. This ensures a 
high security of employees as well as companies with a redundant 
workforce and economies with a higher number of unemployed 
persons than in the liberal model. The latter is the result of the 
employers’ reluctance to hire new employees when times are good 
because they know that it will be hard to dismiss them when the 
economic situation takes a turn for the worse.   
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SERBIAN LABOUR LEGISLATION1
In the first few years of transition, namely, in the 2001-2005 
period, the reform of labor relations was undertaken in Serbia, 
liberalizing in part labor legislation compared to its pre-reform 
model, in force up to that point and adopted under different 
circumstances in 1996. However, free contractual relations between 
employees and employers were not introduced under this labor 
relations reform, which basically emulated the method of regulation 
customary in the European Union (EU), which means a large number 
of solutions implying the inflexibility of labor relations and the 
labor market. The main idea of this method of regulation of labor 
relations is to protect employees from the risks inevitably inherent 
to economic life, i.e. to transfer these risks to the employer only, 
with all financial and other consequences.2 Its main features include 
a considerable level of protection of employees, a highly formalized 
character and a high complexity of labor relations procedures, the 
important role of trade unions imposed by law, and the extension of 
validity of the old General Collective Agreement, which was adopted 
before the reform and which extremely broadened employee rights 
and protection etc. 
The main features of the Serbian Labor Law and related activities 
can be summed up as follows: 
 ● the Labor Law is restrictive; this inflexibility hampers the 
economy in adapting to the environment’s dynamic change 
and leads to lower employment due to the employers’ 
tendency to refrain from it; 
1  The paper entitled Radno zakonodavstvo kao podrška društveno odgov-
ornom preduzetništvu (Labour Legislation as a Support to Socially Respon-
sible Entrepreneurship) by B. Lubarda, Lj. Kovacevic, Mimeo, 2012, was 
used to review Serbian labour legislation 
2  For further details, see Four Years of Transition in Serbia by a group of authors, 
CLDS, 2005, Chapter 10
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 ● the Law is characterized by extreme paternalism, which due 
to the Law’s extensive regulation of all sorts of issues makes 
it impossible for the employer and an employee to make 
arrangements even when this is in their mutual interests; 
 ● chaotic collective bargaining system at national and industry 
levels, including even non-representative participants and 
relying extensively on the so-called extended application 
that is unacceptable, in which way the idea of free collective 
bargaining is violated, while collective bargaining itself is 
turned into its very contradiction; 
 ● such a labor relations system: 
 ○ discourages employers from hiring new employees, 
which coupled with a slow pace of transition and the 
Government’s inappropriate response to the economic 
crisis has led to highly negative employment and 
unemployment trends; 
 ○ favors currently employed persons over the unemployed, 
i.e. it favors predominantly older generations over 
predominantly younger generations through the dismissal 
and employment of a small number of people, which leads 
to the creation of a stable company workforce that hardly 
ever changes; 
 ○ encourages non-compliance with the law, since life 
inevitably tries to avoid unnecessary barriers, so that 
violations of the law are a common  occurrence due to 
both the resolution of real problems (e.g. employees sign 
undated, blank letters or resignation kept by employers) as 
well as the lack of necessary labor legislation expertise in 
small firms; this in turn leads to frequent trials for breaches 
of prescribed procedures, which results in the violation 
of the rule of law and economic losses due to the courts’ 
evident bias in favor of employees3;
3  It is believed that one of the reasons for the above bias lies in the fact that, in 
Serbia, the costs of court proceedings are awarded to the party that has lost a 
lawsuit, which would be too heavy a burden to many employees, as well as the 
fact that it is far easier to collect the costs from employers. 
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 ○ leads to non-standard forms of work arrangements 
(fixed-term employment, temporary agency work, casual 
employment, temporary service contract etc.), aiming to 
solve the issue of a company’s regular workforce in an 
easier way and by cutting costs;  
 ○ encourages transition to grey economy, without any work 
contract, to avoid restrictive provisions of labor legislation; 
 ○ often leads to unnecessary conflicts in a company etc. 
It is noteworthy that, in late 2011, an attempt at a highly 
limited “flexibilisation” of labor legislation in Serbia, provided for by 
the Government’s draft amendments to the Labor Law, was rejected 
by trade unions, which prompted the Government to relinquish 
its own proposal. As we have already seen, the EU has been going 
through a phase of more liberal changes over the entire past decade 
and, consequently, Serbia is lagging behind the EU, adhering to the 
old concept, which is gradually being abandoned even by the EU 
itself.  
ЕUROPEAN PROCESSES
High unemployment, amounting to about 10% in most of 
the countries in the 1980’s and the 1990’s, has prompted the EU 
member states to launch the reform of labor legislation, announced 
already in the Lisbon Strategy of 2000. Modern-day challenges 
in the sphere of entrepreneurship and employment (and the 
European integration process) are linked to profound changes in 
work and life due to the globalization process, development of 
new technologies like information and communication technology 
(Internet), demographic changes caused by population ageing and 
the change in the family structure, strong segmentation of labor 
markets, especially due to the employees’ greater share in small and 
medium-sized employers, as well as a higher number of employees 
working under non-standard forms of work arrangements (outsiders). 
These challenges lead to the transformation of the social model, 
to which two documents of the European Commission including 
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its Green Paper on modernizing labor law to meet the challenges of 
the 21st century (2006) and its communication entitled Towards 
Common Principles of Flexicurity (2007) in particular contribute. The 
Commission inaugurated the concept of flexicurity as an alternative 
to Europe’s traditional social model.   
The concept seeks to replace the security of employment 
based on protective labor legislation with a solution which will 
result in greater flexibility in the labor market and the organization 
of work and higher employability and adaptability of workers 
due to their greater capacity to find and keep jobs thanks to their 
professional skills which are constantly improved, which represents 
the concept of lifelong learning. Broadening the possibility of 
using non-standard types of employment, ranging from fixed-
term employment, via part-time work to casual employment, 
temporary agency work and job sharing, constitutes a major aspect 
of flexibilisation of labor relations. The reform of labor legislation 
should lead to greater adaptability of employees and employers 
(companies) in the context of goals of full employment, higher 
labor productivity and social cohesion. The workers’ adaptability 
through action at the Community and member state level can be 
brought about by better education and professional training of the 
workforce.4 
Labor legislation (and autonomous labor law), among other 
things, aims to support socially responsible entrepreneurship. This 
is reflected in the modern concept of flexicurity, aiming both to 
encourage entrepreneurship and new (productive) employment 
(more and better jobs, which is the Lisbon goal), including in particular 
support to and flexible solutions for newly-established employers 
(entrepreneurs), as well as to ensure that solutions provided for 
by labor legislation pose no obstacle to the establishment and 
operation of small and medium-sized businesses. Consequently, 
support to entrepreneurship is reflected in the following: a) concept 
of employment and active employment policy measures; b) flexible 
contractual arrangements for employment and other forms of work 
4  Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law, European Commission, 2006, р. 3.
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arrangements; c) solutions provided for by individual labor law; d) 
solutions provided for by collective labor law; e) solutions in the 
sphere of social security.     
Labor legislation reforms have not been uniformly designed 
for the entire EU but have instead been undertaken individually by 
every country (or not undertaken at all). However, all those that have 
been enacted into law are aimed at liberalizing labor relations, i.e. 
at reducing job security and generosity of social benefits granted to 
the unemployed, in order to achieve greater labor market flexibility,5 
under the label of flexicurity. 
An overview of adopted/ratified conventions of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO)6 by countries is an illustrative 
manifestation of individual countries’ labor regulation policy. This is 
so due to the fact that the ratification of a convention demonstrates 
a country’s readiness and obligation to apply its content to its 
national legislation, whereas its non-adoption signals a country’s 
intention to keep its freedom of action in a given area of labor 
relations or even not to define a given issue under its legislation at 
all. Consequently, it can be said in principle that the countries which 
have ratified a large number of conventions have more strictly 
regulated labor legislation, while those which have ratified fewer 
conventions are more liberal.  
5  Consequently, in Germany, the following changes were made in the 2003-2005 
period: a longer unemployment benefit eligibility period was introduced, the 
benefit duration period was shortened for older workers, other benefits were 
reduced, for the first time there was a requirement that unemployed persons 
must search for a new job themselves, sanctions were introduced for persons 
turning down job offers, private companies were enlisted to search for jobs for 
the unemployed, employment agencies were reorganised, while temporary 
employment agencies were deregulated, see M. Burda and J. Hunt: What Ex-
plains the German Labour Market Miracle in the Great Recession?, CERP, August 
2011
6  ILO is a United Nations (UN) agency which promotes and supervises the imple-
mentation of international labour standards. Its members include states and 
employer and employee organisations, while its guidance method is based on 
conventions on specific issues, adopted (or not) by member states which later 
translate them into their respective national legislation.  
17
The overview of the ratification of ILO conventions by 
primarily European as well as a number of non-European countries 
reveals the following: the group of countries heading the list 
includes France (102 ratified conventions), Norway (91), Bulgaria 
(84), the Netherlands (83) and Poland (81). It is followed by the 
group of countries with 60-79 ratified conventions, which includes 
Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, Belgium, Slovenia, the Slovak 
Republic, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Serbia (71). The group 
of countries with 40-59 ratified conventions includes Switzerland, 
Australia, Romania, India, Russia and Croatia. The group of countries 
with the lowest number of ratified conventions (under 40) includes 
Canada and Estonia (32), South Korea (27), Singapore and China 
(22), Vietnam (17) and the US (14).    
As one can see, the EU member states i.e. the states promoting 
the so-called protective continental model of highly-regulated labor 
relations are at the top of the list. There is one non-member state 
among them, namely Serbia, which has ratified a large number of 
ILO conventions in a wish to get closer to the EU as soon as possible, 
without dwelling too much upon its own interests and labor market 
conditions.    
The bottom of the list is mainly reserved for European 
countries which are not EU members and non-European countries, 
which have more liberal labor relations but which often also register 
speedier economic growth or a higher GDP than the European 
average. The US has ratified the lowest number of conventions, only 
14 of them, and they do not even include some considered to be 
fundamental (e.g. the one on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining or the one on elimination of discrimination). 
It is noteworthy that there are 189 ILO conventions all in 
all, which means that only one country in the world (France) has 
ratified more than half of them. This proves that the status of ILO 
conventions is neither particularly high in the world, nor are they 
so widely applied as could be concluded from the bulk of reference 
material on labor legislation in Serbia. 
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BASIC WEAK POINTS OF LABOUR LAW IN SERBIA
This section gives an overview of the basic weak points of 
the Labor Law, which we believe make difficult the functioning 
of companies and jeopardize the business environment in Serbia. 
Still, we have not questioned here the current concept of labor 
legislation and fundamental employee rights but have instead tried 
to identify those major issues which represent the weak points but 
which can nevertheless be solved within the existing labor relations 
model. Addressing these shortcomings would to a certain extent 
lead to more flexible solutions, but it would primarily help eliminate 
some obvious omissions in the existing Labor Law, which do not 
necessarily have anything to do with the selection of the labor 
relations model.   
Employment
In contrast to the standard form of employment (permanent 
full-time employment), some non-standard forms including a 
fixed-term/part-time employment contract, a job share contract, 
a temporary agency contract, a casual work contract, a telework 
contract, an    on-call contract etc. are becoming increasingly 
widespread. The cause of the expansion of these forms of 
employment lies in both better adaptation of employment to labor 
processes (more flexible forms in times of insecurity and speedy 
changes in the economic environment) as well as the avoidance 
of numerous restrictions of the existing legislation in the case of 
employment, dismissal etc. Present in many countries (Germany, 
the Netherlands etc.), the process constitutes a major element of 
new employment system.        
Fixed-term employment 
The solution currently provided for by the domestic Labor Law 
stipulates that  fixed-term employment cannot exceed a period of 12 
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months (Article 37, Paragraph 1) and can be entered into in the case 
of seasonal jobs, project-based work and increased volume of work 
over a specific period of time. The above concept is highly inflexible 
and violates the freedom of employer-employee arrangements, 
its idea being to direct employers to hire more people through 
permanent employment, which is a more favorable option for an 
employee. However, the above goal is usually not achieved, since 
the alternatives to fixed-term employment include illicit work (no 
employment at all) as well as non-hiring of employees, leading to 
higher unemployment than in the case of fixed-term employment, 
or the transfer of business activities to grey economy etc. On the 
other hand, dynamic changes in the economic environment, 
accompanied by growing insecurity, economic crises, fluctuations 
in the demand for a company’s products and services, the need 
to cut expenses so that a company could operate with success 
etc. often require considerable and speedy workforce adaptation, 
which cannot be secured efficiently under standard permanent 
employment contracts.   
The said Labor Law concept is quite inflexible from the point of 
view of comparative law solutions. Namely, fixed-term employment 
is allowed in the EU member states regardless of reasons for it but, 
as a rule, its duration is limited to 24 or 36 months, while employee 
security is guaranteed by limiting the number of successive fixed-
term employment contracts, usually to a maximum of three 
successive contracts with one employee (the next contract would 
have to be a permanent employment contract). Consequently, de 
lege ferenda, domestic law ought to envisage a longer period, e.g. 
two or three years, without the obligation to cite reasons for it, 
limiting, however, the maximum number of successive fixed-term 
employment contracts with one employee (e.g. to a maximum of 
three contracts in a reference period). This is suggested also by 
Europe’s framework collective agreement for temporary employees, 
requesting the employer to inform temporary employees about 
their chances of becoming employed on a permanent basis.     
To back newly-established employers encountering initial 
difficulties related to their market survival (competition), it would 
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be good to envisage in their case the possibility of concluding fixed-
term employment contracts even for a three- or four-year period, as 
provided for by e.g. recent German legislation, in order to encourage 
entrepreneurship and new employment in this flexible way as well. 
Job share contract
Domestic positive law makes no mention of this specific form 
of work contract so that the Labor Law should be amended in this 
respect. Job sharing is a specific method of hiring a team (pair) of 
employees, who share a single position on a part-time basis as some 
sort of partners, cooperating in doing their job, making autonomous 
decisions on their work schedule and enjoying the employer’s 
support in developing team cooperation in the fulfillment of 
job duties. The division of work can be initiated by employees 
themselves or can be introduced at the employer’s initiative. In both 
cases, the employer has an additional role of creating a balance in 
meeting the needs and fulfilling the ambitions of the employees 
sharing a job.  
This type of contract can be considered to round off the idea 
of part-time work i.e. to be a solution to some problems resulting 
from this other type of contract. Namely, a part-time contract 
is more preferable for many persons whose family and other 
circumstances (children, health, elderly parents etc.) or preference 
for spare time and the activities which it enables make full-time 
work an unattractive option. However, when the employer hires 
an employee part time (e.g. half time), it is occasionally faced with 
the problem of covering the remaining working hours since it is 
not easy to find another employee of adequate profile and with 
adequate skills willing to work half time as well. In such a situation, 
the “first” employee may be able to find a partner capable of working 
in a pair and ready to do so i.e. to split working hours, regardless of 
the fact whether this is his/her spouse or a stranger he/she finds 
through his/her channels. In this way, two goals can be achieved 
in a complementary manner: the employees’ goal to work shorter 
working hours and the employer’s goal not to feel the negative 
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consequences of this arrangement i.e. to have an employee full 
time.
The positive sides of job sharing include the following: (1) 
better adapted work and spare time to a person’s preferences, 
(2) greater work satisfaction due to less stress and less strenuous 
work, (3) the employer has a chance to hire a skilled, experienced 
employee it could not hire full time, (4) the employer has a chance 
to hire complementary profiles in one job thus increasing job 
efficiency, (5) being less under burden, job-share employees are 
usually more focused at work and more diligent than those working 
full time, which benefits the employer, (6) if one employee is absent 
for any reason, the other is present to fulfill at least a part of the 
most important tasks etc. 
In addition to each employee getting a lower salary, the 
negative sides of job sharing include the following: (1) the sensitivity 
of the issue of shared responsibility between the partners, since 
it is sometimes hard to say who should take the credit/blame for 
something, (2) the partners can (rightly or wrongly) feel that they 
contribute more than just one of them would if he/she worked full 
time and be dissatisfied on account of it, (3) it can sometimes lead 
to confusion in communication, especially if an executive post is 
shared, (4) there are additional administrative costs, double training 
etc.
Like other forms of non-standard work contracts, this type of 
contract, which first started to spread in the US in the 1970’s, has 
been experiencing expansion in the industrialized world over the 
past few decades.   
Telework contract
According to the European model, telework can be defined 
as “a form of organizing and/or performing work using information 
technology, in the context of an employment contract, where the 
work, which could also be performed at the employer’s premises, 
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is carried out away from those premises on a regular basis“.7 This 
type of work is usually done at an employee’s home, although it can 
be performed in other places as well, ranging from coffee shops, 
via internet cafés to rented premises, its major feature being that 
an employee is not located at the same place as his/her colleagues, 
i.e. the people he/she does a specific job with. Naturally, telework 
has been rendered possible by modern communication technology 
and in particular the Internet, telephony, video equipment etc. 
Telework has numerous advantages over the standard form 
of organization of work. For the employer, this means a chance to 
lower considerably the cost of labor and in particular the cost of 
office space and transport of employees. The system also enables 
the employer to hire highly skilled professionals it could not hire 
otherwise because they live too far.  
On the other hand, telework improves the employees’ chances 
of employment without their having to move to other parts of a 
country or a big city or to commute to work in big cities, which is a 
time-consuming activity. Telework is in particular a good solution 
for families whose active-age members find it hard or impossible to 
leave home (children, elderly parents), as well as disabled persons 
who can work without having to go through a strenuous and risky 
ordeal of having to travel to work every day. The system by all means 
enables employees to better organize and use their time, as well as 
to achieve greater independence in the organization, planning and 
performance of work. 
In industrialized countries, this form of work arrangement 
has been registering rapid expansion in the past few decades. 
Consequently, in 2010, the number of people working permanently 
or occasionally at home amounted to 3.7 million in Great Britain.8
Domestic labor legislation does not directly define telework, 
but there is no obstacle to its being organized in keeping with the 
7 European Framework Agreement on Telework concluded by ETUC, UNICE/
UEAPME and CEEP on 16 July 2002, Item 2, Paragraph 1 
8 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-11879241
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Labor Law provisions governing performance of jobs outside the 
employer’s premises (so-called work at home). Still, such a solution 
seems to be insufficient, since telework can be organized in several 
different ways, i.e. it does not have to be done at an employee’s 
home only, but also at the premises owned by third parties (e.g. 
work in the so-called telecottages/telecentres, the opening of 
which could be especially suitable for domestic entrepreneurs at 
local self-government level, i.e. it could be done under the auspices 
of local entrepreneur associations). Consequently, potential 
application of the regulations on work at home to teleworkers will 
depend on a specific type of telework, which makes it necessary 
to define telework directly under Labor Law provisions and/or 
separate collective agreements (concluded for an industry/a local 
self-government). The regulation of some issues under collective 
agreements can even be an advantage due to easier respect for the 
specific features of some forms of this type of work. 
There is a similar form of (often remote) workforce hiring, 
known under the English term of outsourcing. It implies the process 
of contracting a company’s business functions to someone else 
to enable it to focus on its most important operations and reduce 
its expenses by transferring subsidiary activities to someone else. 
However, the essential nature of this arrangement suggests that 
this is not a form of direct workforce hiring or employment but 
usually a commercial contract for the provision of specific services 
between two companies and, consequently, outsourcing will not be 
dealt with by this paper. 
Temporary agency contract
Serbia’s Labor Law makes no mention of a type of work 
arrangement which is becoming increasingly popular in European 
countries.9 Namely, businesses (agencies) are set up to employ 
workers who then work for another business, on a temporary basis 
9 See Temporary agency work in an enlarged European Union, European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
2006
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(due to increased volume of work, to replace an absent employee 
etc.), whereby the work contract is concluded by the two businesses 
(rather than the worker doing the job). In other words, a private 
agency, interested in making a profit, recruits a worker solely to 
“hire out” his/her work temporarily to other businesses that need it, 
so that there is no work contract (or labor relation) between the user 
business and the worker. On the other hand, this work arrangement, 
i.e. a contract between a business (agency) and a worker can be 
concluded for a fixed term as well as an indefinite period of time.10  
The triangle comprising an agency, a business and a worker 
is usually characterized by the following relations: (a) the agency 
has an extensive list of workers looking for jobs, (2) the agency has 
studied their qualifications and skills, (3) the employer needing 
temporary workers contacts the agency and contracts the number 
and structure of workers, their salary per hour and everything else, 
(4) the agency sends the required workers to work at the employer’s, 
(5) the agency pays the workers the agreed rate per hour, and (6) the 
employer pays the agency the agreed sum for the workers’ services. 
In this way, these agencies secure flexibility for both a worker as 
well as the employer. Some provide unskilled workers only, whereas 
others provide specialized, highly skilled experts. 
For the employer, this arrangement can have numerous 
positive effects such as finding the required workers quickly, which 
is not possible if it searches for them itself, avoiding the standard 
form of regular employment in situations when workers are needed 
only temporarily, a chance to avoid paying some expenses such as 
health insurance, paid annual leave etc.
These agencies are attractive for workers, too, because it is 
easier to get a job in this way than to look for it oneself; temporary 
agency work can open the door to permanent employment, since 
some employers use this option as probation when they want to 
hire workers on a permanent basis; a worker is aware that, unlike 
state agencies, these agencies will try hard to find him/her a job, 
10  In Germany, employees are hired by agencies for an indefinite period of time, 
with all the usual benefits (old-age pension, disability and health insurance etc.) 
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motivated by their own interest of making a profit per each worker 
etc.  
The existing Labor Law provisions on temporary assignment 
(Article 174) do not define this sphere properly and, consequently, 
should be completely amended. 
Personal income
The Labor Law overregulates the system of setting salaries 
and other personal income, violating the freedom of employer-
employee arrangements, making impossible more modern 
remuneration systems and causing administrative difficulties to 
employers. Let us have a look at some of its weak points.    
Salary non-differentiation 
The Labor Law makes it impossible for the employer to award 
an employee a salary higher than that received by other staff doing 
the same job, even if a given employee works much better than 
the others and if his/her contribution to the company’s success is 
bigger. The Labor Law achieves this as follows: 
Systematization: The Labor Law stipulates that a company 
should pass a by-law defining jobs, their content (description), 
relevant professional requirements, i.e. that it should adopt a job 
systematization; this provision is by all means unnecessary since it 
is in the interests of every company to have such one document for 
its own organizational reasons (Article 24); however, the reason why 
Serbian legislators make this stipulation is the legal principle that 
all employees should receive equal pay for equal work, while equal 
work is equated with the same job, so that it is practically impossible 
to raise a person’s salary permanently without raising the salaries 
of others holding the same job. This is stipulated in Article 104 of 
the Labor Law:  “All employees shall be granted the equal salary for 
the same work or the work of the same value performed for the 
employer. Work of the same value is defined as the work for which 
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the same educational level, same working ability, responsibility as 
well as physical and intellectual work are needed”.
Statutory salary structure. To tighten the ban on differentiation, 
the Labor Law lays down the salary structure (Article 105), while the 
employer has to define elements for the calculation and payment of 
a base salary and a           performance-based salary under another by-
law. In other words, once jobs and requisite professional skills have 
been defined under a job systematization, each job is linked to a 
relevant base salary and a method of calculation of a performance-
based salary, so that the employer has to invent another job, which 
has to be included in the job systematization, when wishing to 
award someone a salary that is different (bigger or smaller) than 
that received by others. If not, salary differentiation will not be in 
keeping with the law. 
Complex salary calculation system
Salary calculation is further complicated by determining 
the performance-based salary share on a monthly basis, which 
is quite unnecessary for most of employees and real situations in 
business companies. Also, the legal stipulation that a salary based 
on an employee’s contribution to the employer’s business success 
should represent a separate additional mandatory salary category 
is nothing but an unnecessary complication of the salary system 
in Serbia. Since incentive remuneration for good work is in the 
interests of both the employer as well as an employee, operating 
costs should not be increased nor the natural freedom of employer-
employee arrangements violated by excessive red tapes.  
Employee compensation
Employee compensation can be in different forms: the basic 
form includes a salary (base salary and a performance-based 
bonus), but there is also non-salary compensation (benefits-in-
kind, cost coverage and some bonuses). The latter can vary greatly, 
ranging from accommodation cost coverage and the right to use 
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a company car, via an additional pension scheme and additional 
health insurance, to recreation and annual leave cost coverage, 
provision of meals at work, additional education etc.  
In Serbia, a large number of compensation modalities are 
formally included in a salary and, as a result, are subject to rigid tax 
treatment (payroll tax and social contributions), which is unnecessary 
since it is not for the Labor Law to define the taxation of specific 
components of employee remuneration. Namely, it would be more 
logical if the Labor Law did not specify in detail salary components 
and, consequently, the taxation of specific components, leaving 
it instead to tax legislation to deal with the tax aspect. This would 
enable the exclusion of some potential benefits, such as the use of 
company cars and accommodation cost coverage, from a salary and 
their more favorable tax treatment. 
Salary compensation during leave 
Salary compensation during differently motivated leave 
(Articles 114-116) must be based on the average salary in the 
preceding three-month period, which means that a salary based on 
performance, overtime, night shifts and shift work, work on public 
holidays, company-paid meal, holiday cash grants, annual bonus etc. 
must also be included. This is not a good solution because it does 
not make any sense that the compensation base of an employee 
currently not working should include a performance-based salary 
as if his/her output were outstanding. This is more so in a situation 
when high one-off bonus payments (e.g. annual remuneration) 
were made in the preceding three months, distorting the picture 
of an employee’s current salary. The same goes for all other forms 
of occasional compensation causing also considerable deviation of 
a three-month salary from a standard salary. Such a solution leads 
to significant differences in salary compensation of otherwise equal 
employees, depending on when they are due to receive it. It is far 
more just that a base salary without the salary segment calculated 
on other grounds should constitute the compensation base, which 
could then be increased by stored-up labor.   
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Disciplinary accountability
A major weakness of the Labor Law is the lack of clear 
provisions on disciplinary accountability i.e. on the sanctioning of 
employees for the violation of their duties and failure to observe 
labor discipline. Admittedly, there are elaborate provisions on 
dismissal based on the above grounds. Disciplinary accountability 
is touched on in the legal provisions on temporary suspension 
from work without pay (Article 170), but the sanction is symbolic 
and therefore ineffective: the maximum sanction implies three-day 
suspension without pay.  
Other provisions on disciplinary accountability simply do not 
exist in the Labor Law, which is interpreted in different ways. There 
are some who believe that the Law clearly indicates that, under our 
law, employees are accountable for the violation of their duties and 
that employers can define the issue of violation of duties and labor 
discipline either independently or together with the relevant trade 
union. Another interpretation, contrary to the previous, is based 
on the position that the Labor Law does not at all define or even 
mention disciplinary accountability, measures and proceedings, nor 
does it envisage that the matter be dealt with in more detail under 
the employer’s by-law. Such a stand is primarily affirmed by views 
held by the ministry in charge of labor affairs as well as decisions 
taken by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia, 
which, assessing the legality of provisions of by-laws defining the 
issue of employee disciplinary accountability, took the stand that 
disciplinary accountability, proceedings, bodies and measures 
could not be defined under by-laws, which was a common practice 
of many domestic employers (labor rule books), i.e. social partners 
(collective agreements).11 
11  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia, IU No. 213/2004 
оf 23 June 2005 (Official Gazette of the RoS, No. 68/05); Decision of the Consti-
tutional Court of the Republic of Serbia, IU No.  494/2004 оf 14 July 2005 (Of-
ficial Gazette of the RoS, No. 68/2005).
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The Constitutional Court’s position means that, in Serbia, 
employee disciplinary accountability is limited to dismissal only,12 
quite needlessly making it impossible to introduce an offence of 
lesser gravity than that deserving dismissal, and prohibiting other 
sanctions (e.g. temporary salary deductions) which would be in 
proportion to the gravity of a given offence.  
Such a solution does not make any sense either from the 
point of view of ensuring labor discipline or from the point of view 
of comparative law solutions.  In view of the fact that the issue 
of disciplinary accountability is traditionally dealt with by labor 
legislation in terms of both substantive as well as formal law, the 
existing concept of disciplinary accountability in domestic labor 
legislation should be reconsidered. The Labor Law should either (1) 
define the issue of disciplinary accountability in more detail or (2) 
make it mandatory for employers to regulate the issue themselves 
under their respective  by-laws. 
Dismissal
We shall not analyze the transition to the liberal concept of 
dismissal at this point, since it would require declaring ineffective 
ILO Convention No. 158 as well as the Revised European Social 
Charter, ratified by our state in the capacity of Council of Europe 
member state. Nevertheless, the Labor Law has some weak points 
even within this concept. 
Complex procedures 
One of the problems concerns the complex procedures 
envisaged for some types of dismissal, making employers reluctant 
to dismiss staff even when legal grounds for the move evidently 
exist. Let us mention just a few of them:
 ● in the case of abuse of sick leave, before dismissal, the 
12  We shall disregard for the time being three-day suspension from work as a sym-
bolic sanction. 
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employer has to prove in a formal and complex way (by 
establishing an employee’s fitness for work in the relevant 
health care institution) that sick leave has indeed been abused; 
consequently, dismissal is automatically wrongful if the abuse 
has not been established in the statutory way, even when it 
evidently exists; a better solution would be for the employer 
to be entitled to exercise the right to dismissal also by 
investigating itself the abuse, on condition that the employer 
provides valid evidence of it in potential court proceedings, 
 ● situation is similar in the case of a labor-related offence: under 
the stand by the Supreme Court of Cassation,13 dismissal on 
these grounds is possible only once a ruling to this effect 
becomes final, which usually means in a few years and which 
automatically means that dismissal before the ruling’s finality 
is wrongful, even if it is evident that an offence exists; in this 
case, too, a better solution would be for the employer to be 
entitled to exercise the right to dismissal also by investigating 
itself the nature of an offence, while the (il)legality of dismissal 
would be definitively assessed according to a final ruling. 
Consequences of wrongful dismissal 
In Article 191, the Labor Law sets the framework for damage 
compensation if a court delivers a final ruling that an employee 
has suffered wrongful dismissal. In addition to reinstating the 
employee, the employer has to compensate him/her in the amount 
of the salary and other emoluments he/she has lost, unpaid social 
contributions included.   
Even though the principle of damage compensation for 
wrongful dismissal makes sense, the question remains of where to 
set the limits to that compensation. For, it is not only the employer 
that is responsible for the number of months during which an 
employee does not work following his/her dismissal, but also the 
court itself due to the slow pace of its proceedings (lasting usually 
13 Legal interpretation by the Civil Division of  Serbia’s Supreme Court of Cas-
sation of 30 November 2004 
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several years). In other words, it is not fair that the employer should 
also compensate the damage which it did not cause itself but which 
was caused by someone else instead. Consequently, limiting the 
employer’s obligation by setting the maximum number of monthly 
salaries which can be awarded would by all means make sense 
as a way of the employer’s protection from the slow pace of the 
courts’ proceedings, but also as a stimulus to courts to process labor 
disputes of this kind faster. 
Severance pay 
Severance pay is an important element in the event of 
termination of employment due to both retirement as well as 
dismissal by the employer when there is no longer a need for a specific 
job or when the volume of work has decreased. In Serbia, it goes 
without saying that an employee is entitled to severance pay, as if 
it were an irrevocably acquired right or a civilizational achievement. 
However, it is not quite certain that the right to severance pay is 
based on strong reasons. Firstly, the right to severance pay in the 
event of retirement is quite evidently debatable, because there is no 
valid reason why the employer should improve a former employee’s 
financial position once he/she retires. Secondly, even though the 
countries with a legal/quasi legal obligation (laid down in collective 
agreements) to provide severance pay are far more numerous in 
the world, there are many countries including Belgium, Ireland, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland where the provision 
of severance pay in the event of dismissal is not a legal obligation 
and where the social security of an employee once he/she loses 
his/her job is entirely ensured through unemployment insurance. 
Moreover, ILO’s Termination of Employment Convention No. 158 is 
not binding to the countries which have ratified it in the sense that 
they have to include the obligation of provision of severance pay, 
leaving it to them instead to choose between severance pay and 
unemployment insurance as well as other state programs.
The second problem related to severance pay in Serbia 
concerns its levels: in the event of retirement it amounts to three 
monthly salaries, whereas in the event of dismissal due to reduced 
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volume of work it amounts to at least one third of a monthly 
salary for each of the first ten years of service and one fourth of a 
monthly salary for each subsequent year. In the countries coping 
with the second wave of the crisis, severance pay is reduced, which 
is believed to be a stimulus to employment due to lower potential 
dismissal costs. This is the course taken by Spain and Portugal in 
2012.14
The third problem in domestic labor law concerns the 
provision of Article 158, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Law stipulating 
that severance pay be provided for every year of an employee’s 
total years of service rather than the years of service he/she has 
accumulated with a given employer. This (1) enables an employee 
to collect severance pay several times in different companies for the 
same years of service and (2) makes it obligatory for the employer 
to provide severance pay for the years of service an employee has 
not accumulated with it.   
Extended application of collective agreements
In Serbia, the collective bargaining system is mainly modeled 
after the European standards but nevertheless has some weak points 
in terms of both its regulation as well as its application. The major 
weak point is that the competent minister can decide to extend the 
application of one collective agreement so as to include employers 
that are not members of the employer association which has signed 
a given collective agreement (Article 257). This was indeed done in 
early 2009, for example, only to be annulled soon after.15 
14  See http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-13/spain-cuts-severance-
pay-on-new-open-ended-job-contracts.html; ttp://www.portugaldailyview.
com/whats-new/labour-law-severance-pay-to-get-severely-severed
15  At the very start of the economic crisis in 2009, an annex to the General Collec-
tive Agreement was signed between trade unions and the Union of Employers 
(which should represent the employers’ interests) providing for a 20% salary 
rise. Governed by his great wish to enable all in Serbia to experience the ben-
efits of this excellent idea of how to prevent the negative effects of the crisis, 
the Minister decided that the application of this annex should be extended to 
all employees. A few days later, the Government annulled his document.   
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The reasons against this provision are numerous and convincing:
 ● it violates the freedom of collective bargaining, guaranteed 
under ILO conventions, because it extends the agreement 
reached by two parties, namely, a trade union and what is by all 
means a minority employer association, to those that have not 
taken part in the bargaining, i.e. employers that are members 
of other associations or are not members of any associations 
and that represent the great majority; 
 ● it brings legal insecurity to business operation, since employers 
do not know if and when the minister will exercise his/her 
right mentioned above and regulate many crucial elements of 
business operation (e.g. employee salaries), which directly and 
vitally affect a company’s financial results; 
 ● it introduces political motives to collective bargaining, since 
the competent minister can be governed by the interests of 
the Government and the ruling coalition when considering the 
extended application; in this way, politics unnecessarily finds 
its way into economic life causing negative effects and starting 
to affect  private sector operations directly;  
 ● it prompts representative employer and employee 
organizations to study the effect which collective bargaining 
has on them as organizations rather than as employees or 
employers; the Union of Employers of Serbia has thus noticed 
that its membership is dwindling due to its acceptance of 
collective agreements which only refer to the employers that 
have joined the Union and, consequently, it has now taken a 
stand on the matter, informing the Ministry that it will no longer 
sign collective agreements if it is not immediately stipulated 
that they have extended application;16 the Union hopes that, 
in this way, the reason why employers have withdrawn from 
it (to avoid the application of a collective agreement) will be 
eliminated; 
16  Analiza primene Opšteg kolektivnog ugovora 2008-2011 (Analysis of the Applica-
tion of the General Collective Agreement 2008-2011), Union of Employers, 2011, р. 
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 ● it extends the application to all firms within one system of 
collective agreements that is not in line with the principles 
of a modern market economy (e.g. salary levels are set based 
on the coefficient and the minimum cost of labor rather than 
modern performance measurement systems etc.);
 ● it extends the application of a collective agreement made 
through the participation of an employer association with a 
highly debatable representativeness, which cannot be taken 
to represent a major segment of Serbia’s economy. For, the 
Union of Employers rallies small businessmen (shop owners 
and similar), so that their share in employment or added 
value in Serbia is insignificant. Consequently, the Union does 
not represent a relevant economic force nor does it include 
a relevant number of employees, so that essentially it cannot 
represent Serbia’s employers.  
•	
Such a politicized system of extended application of collective 
agreements, without the involvement of employers representing 
the dominant segment of the economy, has turned into its very 
contradiction, whereby one side seeks to recruit votes, the other is 
trying to fulfill its petty personal interests and yet another one to 
meet the interests of the stratum it represents, while the interests of 
the country’s economic recovery and development are neglected 
in the process.  
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION
As in many other European countries, both the general as well 
as the political public in Serbia labors under some misconceptions 
about the labor market and labor legislation, namely, the 
misconceptions that employers will do the following: 
 ● stop hiring new employees if not under pressure from or 
encouraged by the state, 
 ● immediately start dismissing employees if the state and its 
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legislation do not prevent dismissals, and 
 ● reduce employee salaries if there is no legal protection of 
employees or if there are no collective agreements. 
This is by no means true since it is in the employers’ best interests: 
 ● to achieve the highest level of production possible and, 
consequently, the highest employment possible, because they 
will increase their profit in this way, 
 ● not to dismiss good workers, whose training always costs, so 
that they want to keep them in their firms in the long term, 
 ● to pay well good employees, in keeping with market conditions, 
because they will find a job in other firms if this is not the case. 
The present labor legislation has shifted the balance between 
rights and responsibilities in favor of employees and to the 
disadvantage of employers. In the long term, the result is lower 
employment and a less efficient economy. If Serbia wants to embark 
on the road to a real economic recovery, one of the reform areas 
should also include labor legislation. The EU has already taken steps 
to this effect. 
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